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1 This  article discusses how the development of  computer communication networks in
socialist Poland was influenced by imagery of economic, scientific and social progress1. I
argue  that  attempts  at  establishing  computerized  communications  networks  were
interdependent with imagery of electronic communication as an agent of economic and
scientific progress. This imagery was juxtaposed to one of computer networks as, in Paul
Edward’s phrase, a “closed world” – a closed system of gathering and circulating data in
which  any  intrusion  from  outside  is  considered  as  a  hostile  act.2 While  discussing
attempts to build computer networks in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s, I show how their
possible impact on society, economics, and science entered public understanding of this
telecommunication technology. During the two decades discussed in this paper, computer
professionals, policy makers, and the scientific community actively influenced the social
construction of computer communications. As I demonstrate, both imageries of scientific
progress and of a “closed world” had a substantial impact on the emergence of computer
networks and the ability of Polish users to access international networks.  This paper
focuses on two computer networks : economic management systems from the 1970s that
included exclusively institutional users, and modem‑based communication systems from
the 1980s, which enabled network access for private computer users. While discussing
both networks, I also show the evolution of a network from a technological infrastructure
available only to institutional users to an open system of international communications
that could be accessed by individual users of computer modems. 
2 Current scholarship of the social construction of media and telecommunications systems
emphasizes the political economy and societal impact of technological infrastructures.3
Electronic Battlefields, Visions of Progress and Computer Networks in State S...
Cahiers du monde russe, 56/2-3 | 2015
1
This  historical  case,  by  contrast,  shows how a  particular  telecommunications  system
came into being through negotiating the cultural meanings of computer communication
itself  across  the  activities  of  relevant  institutions,  communities  and  individuals  who
actively co‑constructed those same computer networks.4 
3 In a recent study of  the building of  transnational  material  infrastructures in Europe,
Alexander Badenoch and Andreas Fickers pointed out a significant drawback of studies of
different “networks” such as railroad systems, telecommunications and civilian aviation. 
Where  the  role  of  such  networks  is  mentioned,  it  is  very  often  in  terms  that
acknowledge their role in transforming society, but far less often to offer a detailed
analysis of the complex and contested processes by which such structures came
about.5 
4 In other words, scholarly literature to date overwhelmingly focuses on the consequences,
not the construction, of transnational network infrastructures. The history of Cold War
computer network technologies is embedded in a teleological master narrative of “the
history of the Internet” which emphasizes the catchy history of the ARPANET network
appropriated by scientists who found peaceful purposes for the same technology.6 The
basic  drawback  of  such  a  master  narrative  is  that  it  is  based  on  a  technological
deterministic approach grounded in an assumption that networks, once built, influence
social change. Vincent Mosco’s recent study Digital Sublime successfully challenges such a
master  narrative  and  demonstrates  what  the  exploration  of  historical  processes  of
negotiating computer networks’ meanings can tell us about power configurations within
the worlds of politics, scientific communities, and societies.7 In this article, instead of
trying to recount a local “history of the Internet,” I show how public understanding of
computer  networks  was  embedded  in  contemporary  discussions  about  improving
scientific management of the social economy, opening up to the West, and catching up
with recent technological developments. 
5 The article is based on a content analysis of computer magazines, documents of state
agencies, legislative acts, and testimonies of data communication practitioners. The first
section outlines the political and cultural contexts of computer network development
during  the  Cold  War.  The  second  section  reconstructs  Polish  discourse  towards
“automated information transmission systems” in the late 1960s and 1970s. Subsequent
sections discuss attempts to develop academic computer networks and attempts to link
Polish computer modem users to international “electronic communities.”
 
The cold war and telecommunications networks
6 Thanks to  developments  in telecommunications  and computer  technologies  after  the
Second World War, automated information transfer became widespread, and cybernetics
grew popular. In the 1950s, cybernetics played a significant role in providing several new
technologies  with practical  scenarios  of  their  applications for  military,  scientific  and
economic  purposes.8 Edwards,  while  explaining  the  nature  of  the  “closed  world,”
discusses  how  telecommunication  networks  were  considered  in  the  US  as  military
systems dedicated to the gathering and circulation of data.9 In this “closed world,” any
intrusion from the outside would be considered a hostile act. 
7 The significance of those computer networks constituting the technical infrastructure of
the  “closed  world,”  such  as  SAGE  and  ARPANET,  overshadowed  the  simultaneous
development of several civilian online information services, such as airline reservation
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systems, library catalogues and indexed law and medical databases.10 At the same time,
top  decision  makers  in  centrally  planned  economies  acknowledged  the  concept  of
applying computer network technology to social and economic planning. Attempts to use
networks in planning in the USSR and Salvador Allende’s Chile have been discussed by
Slava Gerovich and Eden Medina.11 As Gerovich pointed out, despite the demise of the
Soviet project of  a nationwide network of data centres,  computer networks from the
1960s  existed  in  the  public  imagination  as  an  element  of  the  socialist  future  which
promised  better  management  of  state  affairs.12 Computer  networks,  as  Gerovich  and
Medina showed, became a constant element in the imagined futures of both capitalism
and socialism, along with fibre optics and telecommunications satellites.13 
8 In the 1980s computer networks and, more broadly, telecommunications systems, were
publicly  introduced in a  new context  as  an “electronic  battlefield,”  the precursor  to
present‑day “cyber warfare.” This new context was influenced by currents in the US. The
development of military and civilian computer networks in the 1980s was accompanied
by the rise of  the figure of  a  malevolent  computer hacker.  The potential  dangers of
hacking computer systems also triggered discussion of the potential malevolent use of
computer  networks  by  Soviet  saboteurs,  or  even  as  part  of  World  War  Three.  Such
imagery was described in detail in the electronic bulletin The Risks Digest, where Western
computer professionals shared their fears :
[…] any sector of society can be destabilized, even completely paralyzed – industry
and  defense,  civil  and  military  communications,  logistics  and  transport,  public
administration,  the  entire  economy –  simply  by  a  couple  of  keystrokes  on  a
computer  terminal,  anywhere  in  the  world.  We  do  definitely  see  this  as  the
electronic battleground of the future, and we definitely see ourselves of being in
the process of seizing the high ground for ourselves before the other side can get
there.14
9 It is interesting to see how the military potential of computer networks was considered
on the both sides of the Iron Curtain. In 1988, one of the senior political officers in the
Military Political  Academy, a university for Polish politruks,  outlined recent American
technological developments in a lecture : 
It  is  remarkable  that  in  the  US  today  the  so‑called  “electronic  battlefield”  is
considered seriously. The US military command has eight plans for global war and
sixty  plans  for  critical  operations  in  which  data  could  be  transmitted  in  a  few
minutes. And everything with the help of a computer.15
10 As he further claimed, this was an instance of a potentially “scary” use of computer
technology facilitated by the US military command.  Alexei  Yurchak has  discussed in
depth how the “Imaginary West” was used as a negative point of reference in the USSR
juxtaposed with positive images of  currents of  the Soviet  Union.16 Information about
recent  developments  in  telecommunication  technologies  by  the  military‑industrial
complex in the West, contrasted with peaceful applications in the Soviet Bloc, played a
similar role in Polish media discourse. 
11 By contrast, in Western media discourse, the hacker peril, popularized by the film War
Games (1983)  offered  not  only  the  vision  of  American  adolescents  tinkering  with
computers, but also of a Soviet intrusion into telecommunications networks. As one The
Risks Digest contributor wrote : 
If it were in the Soviet Union’s vital interest to wreck the operation of the phone
system, and they were willing to spend a few billion a year to do so, of course they
could do it.17
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12 It is also interesting to consider both sides of the story of computer viruses from the
1980s. The Polish computer magazine IKS (Informatyka Komputery Systemy), published by
the military publishing house, quoted an article from Soviet Pravda with a story about a
recent visit of American students to one of the Soviets’ computer centres. According to
this story, one of the students brought some floppy disks infected with viruses, which
then spread in the centre. However, the article reassured readers that “Soviet scientists
are intensively working on finding a cure for this peculiar electronic illness.”18 Among
computer professionals  in  the West  in late  1980s,  Bulgaria’s  rising software industry
became known as a virus factory. Experts from American antivirus companies claimed
that in a single year, 1987, Bulgaria released seventy‑six viruses, giving it the dubious
privilege of being the “world’s single largest virus contributor.”19 Among those viruses
was the Dark Avenger, considered the most malicious PC virus at the time. Viruses could
thus be viewed as a peril that came from the West to intentionally or unintentionally
disrupt  Soviet  computer  networks  or  as  a  product  of  an  orchestrated  Bulgarian
virus‑manufacturing program that aimed to disrupt American networks.
13 Authors of a popular book on media piracy in the 1980s even claimed that : “It is believed
that in 1981 Soviet scientists working in Eastern Europe twice managed to break into
major western computer networks, and it has probably happened many times before and
since.”20 The testimony of an American computer hobbyist from Oklahoma shows how the
attempts of a Polish modem user to establish a connection with American hobbyists was
rather  unwelcomed  by  US  governmental  agencies.  In  the  1980s,  he  established  a
connection with an unnamed Pole through FidoNet, then a highly popular modem data
transfer protocol that enabled easy international communication with other computers
used as “gateways,” which forward messages to other recipients.
I started communicating with the fellow in Poland, regularly helping him getting
his FidoNet going […] I was his gateway out of the Poland […] I am sitting at home
one day and got this knock on the door and it’s two guys in the suits and they want
to talk to me. They asked me […] if I ran a lot of equipment that use the modem.
And I said “Yes, I do.” […] And they said “We need to speak with you.” They wanted
the explanation what this was. We went to the backroom I showed them computer
equipment  […]  Finally  they  got  to  the  point.  “Did  you  communicate  with  this
individual in Poland ?” “Well, yes I do” […] “We would like to know why you are
sending him encrypted communications to a communist country ?” So I  showed
them the communications I’ve been doing. At this point it was obviously clicked for
them  that…  I  didn’t  understand  any  politics  involved  …  They  left  with  the
comment… “You need to understand that people in Poland have to register copy
machines so imagine what kind of person you are talking to who owns a computer
with a phone line.“ With that they left.21
14 As I  will  further  show,  while  in  the US,  a  Polish computer  modem user  accessing a
computer network was considered an intrusion into the “closed world,” in Poland at the
same time, this kind of activity was rather welcomed as an instance of normalization and
“catching  up  with  the  West.”  During  my  research  I  was  unable  to  find  any  source
suggesting  that  any  Polish  governmental  or  law enforcement  agencies  attempted  to
control or discourage modem users from establishing modem connections across the Iron
Curtain.22
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Networks for economic and social management
15 This  section  discusses  how  the  discourse  of  economic  progress  influenced  plans  to
develop Polish computer networks in the 1970s. While studying the attempts to establish
the  “automated  information  system”  in  the  USSR,  Gerovich  showed  how  computer
professionals and supporters of cybernetics successfully promoted this communications
system by providing it with political meanings, thus making it accessible and acceptable
to policy makers.23 This case shows how technical experts are capable of shaping “scripts”
of technology use. Madeleine Akrich in her influential paper on this matter discussed the
role of such experts : 
Engineers,  managers,  and  designers  not  only  define  the  characteristics  of  the
emergent artifacts but also define actors with specific tastes, competences, motives,
aspirations, political prejudices and the rest.24 
16 In  1960s  Poland,  the  computer  professionals  who  established  the computer
manufacturing state enterprise Elwro in Wrocław successfully convinced policy makers
that computers were not only capable of solving abstract mathematical problems, but
could also be successfully applied in the management of centrally controlled economic
and social planning. Beyond this milieu of computer professionals, economists, heavily
influenced by cybernetics at that time, also supported the application of computers to
enhance socialist economic management. In 1967 Oskar Lange published an influential
paper entitled “The Computer and the Market,” where he argued that computer systems
were capable of successfully controlling the centrally planned economy.25
17 To implement such control and management, it  was necessary to plan and develop a
system  of  “information  transfer”  which  would  connect  computers  in  relevant  state
institutions. Two resolutions of the Council of Ministers, in 1964 and 1965, acknowledged
“research  on  information  transfer  and  the  use  of  data  processing  for  planning  and
management” as significant areas for state‑supported research and development (R&D).26
In 1966, Nowe Drogi [New Paths], a monthly journal and the official organ of the Polish
United  Workers’  Party  (PZPR),  which  usually  published  speeches  of  top‑rank  party
officials, published an article by Eugeniusz Zadrzyński on the role of computers in state
socialism.27 Zadrzyński was an engineer and party activist who was shortly appointed as
the  chief  of  a  government  department  of  energetics.  In  the  Nowe  Drogi article,  he
discussed on‑going trends in the West : “In the world, electronic calculating machines are
applied  […]  in  all  areas  where  speeding  up  information  circulation  enables  the
improvement of  decision‑making processes.“28 As he further argued,  the same means
should be implemented to improve decision‑making processes in social and economic
planning in Poland. At that time in Poland there were no automated information transfer
networks. Computer data could only be transferred by the circulation of magnetic tapes
or  punch‑card data.  This  method of  data  circulation was  used in  the ZETO (Zakłady
Elektronicznej  Techniki  Obliczeniowej  ‑  Electronic  Data  Processing  Works)  computer
centres that  provided  state  enterprises  and  institutions  with  computer  access  and
calculating power. 
18 The first nationwide computer network dedicated to economic and social planning, to be
named MERKURY,  was proposed in 1973 during a conference on the development of
“Nationwide Data Processing System.“29 The eighteen‑page MERKURY proposal document
is a detailed description of the conceptual system of state‑socialist,  centrally planned
Electronic Battlefields, Visions of Progress and Computer Networks in State S...
Cahiers du monde russe, 56/2-3 | 2015
5
economies and social planning systems. It explains in detail how several state agencies
and enterprises should be engaged in an automatic system of data circulation. One of the
interesting features of this plan is a collection of diagrams showing a conceptual model of
the MERKURY as a complex network of interdependencies connected with one or two side
arrows. These diagrams provide a clearer picture of the whole system and show a graphic
model of the power structure as several simultaneous acts of communication. It shows an
imaginary process of communication in state socialism, thus revealing how an imagined
network articulates discrete connections between relevant state agencies. Such diagrams
are not only plans of a computer network, but also diagrams of the basic model of the
power relations between the state, the economy and society in the political imaginary of
state socialism. 
19 In the MERKURY proposal,  state enterprises were ordered to transfer data on actual
production output as feedback to relevant ministries and to the Central Statistical Office.
With the full set of economic data available, they should be able to make decisions on
eventual change in the central economic plan and implement these decisions through the
same automated system. The basic rule of the system, and the most frequently used term
in the document, is “management” (“zarządzanie”). This term at the same time refers to
the power configuration in the whole centrally planned, state socialist economy and to
the Taylorist principle of scientific management. Every participant of the system was
engaged in an automated process of sending reports to other agencies located higher or,
rather, more “centrally,” in the power structure and stood ready to implement orders
sent as automated feedback. 
20 It  is important to emphasize the use of term “user” (“użytkownik”) in relevant state
documents. Here this term always refers to an organizational structure rather than an
individual human being. Virtually all documents which discuss computer networks before
the mid‑1980s consider only organizational structures such as governmental agencies,
companies or research institutes as possible “users.” At that time, there were no privately
owned  computers,  and  in  both  the  capitalist  and  socialist  worlds,  all  mainframe
computers were used only in organizational structures. However, documents such as the
MERKURY  proposal,  written  in  a  specific  bureaucratic  jargon,  also  refer  to  an
organizational  culture  of  state  socialism,  where  no  single  human  being,  but  rather
collective institutions had agency and could influence other bureaucratic structures. The
socialist culture of collectiveness is embodied by the propaganda image of Politburos –
collective and  unanimous  ruling  bodies.30 MERKURY’s  primary  aim  was  to  provide
decision‑making bodies with a means of carrying out fully rational, thus more efficient,
planning based on scientific methods. In both means and aims, the MERKURY plan was
completely consistent with communist ideological principles and merged the language of
cybernetics  with  communist  party  jargon.  The  MERKURY  plan  could  be  read  as  an
unfulfilled vision of a group of cyberneticists and computer professionals. However, it
also provides insight into an attempt to apply technology to achieve a fully efficient
system  of  economic  and  social  planning,  one  of  the  foundational  elements  in  the
imaginary future of Communism.
21 In 1974 the Council of Ministers approved a resolution in which the development of the
System Informatyczny Planowania Centralnego or CENPLAN (a Soviet‑style acronym of
CENtralne PLANowanie – Central Planning), based of the MERKURY system. was included
in  a  plan  of  the  development  of  the  computer  industry.  The  governmental  decision
outlined CENPLAN as “a governmental system of automatic data collection, processing,
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and sharing of data which are intended for the needs of central planning of the state’s
social‑economic  development.”31 This  system  was  supposed  to  use  a  nationwide,
dedicated telecommunications network and, as the document stated : ”The Minister of
Communications is currently developing a long‑standing program of building nationwide
data transmission networks.”32 However, the CENPLAN was plausibly developed only as
an administrative system with little or no use of telecommunications technology. 
22 Development plans for several computer and telecommunications systems were included
in the central plans for technological development in the years 1986‑1990. The official
plan for technological development for 1986‑1990 acknowledged by the the Council of
Ministers included a number of focal  points for further technological  progress :  “The
development  of  new  generation  supercomputers  with  the  application  of  artificial
intelligence,  the  development  of  mass  means  for  data  processing  technologies,
professional  and  personal  computers,  modern  communication  systems.”33 Such  plans
were not backed up by any specific measures, and they were extensively criticized by
columnists in Komputer magazine), which actively promoted computerization of Poland.
For instance, in 1986 a Komputer columnist ridiculed a claim of the Vice Prime Minister in
the Polish economic journal Rynki Zagraniczne [Foreign Markets] on the role of Polish
participation in COMECON.  The Vice Prime Minister claimed that  Poland would soon
specialize in “the development of superfast computers,” “fibre optics communications
systems”  and  a  “new  generation  of  telecommunications  and  television  transmission
satellite systems.”34 Komputer columnists argued that neither “superfast computers” nor
the “new generation of satellite systems” could be built in Poland since governmental
agencies responsible for the support of R&D in IT technologies, aside from public claims,
offered no coherent policy. Nevertheless, we can read such claims as propaganda whose
aim was  to  show  that  the  Polish  government  was  actively  carrying  out  a  policy  of
“catching up with the West” in terms of technological progress.
23 In  the  next  section,  I  discuss  the  very  limited  development  of  academic  computer
networks  in the 1980s.  However,  it  is  necessary to  point  out  one computer  network
beyond academia that did exist. In the early 1980s, the Polish national airline LOT joined
SITA (Société Internationale de Télécommunications Aéronautiques),  an international,
modem‑network based reservation system.35 Poland had a shared computer server in
Atlanta to share information with American airlines and travel agents on popular flight
routes from Poland to the US. This system was highly welcomed by the editors of Bajtek
popular computer magazine as a working international computer network, which shows
that,  despite  the  on‑going  political  and  economic  crisis  of  the  1980s,  Poland  was
attempting  to  catch up with  the  West.36 It  is  worth noting  that  this  system had no
dedicated  communication  infrastructure  network,  but  rather  utilized  the  public
telephone network. The poor quality of the telephone infrastructure meant that when a
single telephone line near Warsaw failed in 1987,  Poles were left unable to book any
international  plane tickets  for  a  few days.37 As  we shall  see,  the poor quality  of  the
telephone infrastructure  was  also  a  significant  problem for  individual  Polish modem
users.
24 Another  interesting  case  is  the  establishment  of  international  telecommunications
systems. The Soviet Intersputnik satellite launched in 1974, and the main Polish satellite
telecommunications  centre  was  opened  in  Psary  in  central  Poland  the  same  year.
Intersputnik was used for the retransmission of television broadcasts, mostly from the
Soviet Bloc states. In a press article, the former Director of the Psary Centre, Wiesław
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Dzierżak, explained that despite extensive costs, Poland also had to join the maritime
satellite telecommunications system INMARSAT in 1987 because, beginning in 1988, the
British Lloyd’s  Register  refused to register  any civilian vessels  without  this  system.38
Polish  networking  with  both  the  SITA  and  the  INMARSAT  systems  signals  how  a
state‑socialist country actively chose to join international telecommunications networks
in order to continue commercial operations in a global marketplace.
 
Contested visions of international scientific networks
25 All of the imagined, proposed and planned networks discussed in previous section were
based on acts of communication between institutional actors such as administrative units
and state owned enterprises. Even though few of these networks came to fruition, at the
same time the concept of a computer network became recognized as a viable system of
communication by the academic community. Here we can see how plans of computer
networks articulated the structure of pre‑existing scientific community as a network of
research  centres  and  individual  scientists.39 At  the  same  time  access  to  computer
networks provided scientists with new opportunities to foster academic collaboration. In
his study on the post‑war internationalization of scientific life in Western Europe, John
Krige discussed the rise of academic exchange between the US and Europe and outlines an
on‑going process of “scientific internationalism.” “‘Internationalism’ was intrinsic to the
scientific  ethos,  and  international  scientific  exchange  and  collaboration  was  a
well‑established  mode  of  communication  between scientists  in  different  countries.”40
Krige  discussed state‑sponsored  research  exchange  systems  which,  much  like  to  the
Marshall Plan, aimed to build closer ties between the US and European states. A similar
ethos  of  “internationalism”  was  also  embedded  in  the  discourse  supporting  the
development of international academic contacts within the Soviet Bloc.41 
26 In Poland the first actual computer network that linked geographically dispersed centres
was CYFRONET used by the Instytut Badań Jądrowych (IBJ, Institute for Nuclear Research)
in Świerk near  Warsaw.  This  network,  opened in  June 1973,  was  based on a  central
computer Cyber 72 bought from the Control Data Corporation (CDC). The computer itself
was located in a research centre that operated the nuclear reactor in Świerk. CYFRONET
used the public telephone network, and linked IBJ with ten research centres in Warsaw
with modems. The main purposes of CYFRONET were “the remote control of large and
complex data  processing tasks”  and “the distribution of  experimental  data  from the
scientific nuclear reactor in Świerk” to research institutes, which would process them.42
This system was supposed to bring about the internationalization of  research among
nuclear physicists. “Using large software and data banks through internal exchange and
international cooperation” was declared as a future application of CYFRONET.43 Zurich,
the Institute for  Energy Technology in Kjeller  (Norway),  the Boris  Kidrič  Institute of
Chemistry in Ljubljana and the Saclay Nuclear Research Centre (France).44 However, no
available records indicate what kind of cooperation actually took place. Frank Dittman, in
his detailed study of the development of international computer networks in the Soviet
Bloc, pointed out that the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in
Vienna  also  played  a  significant  role  as  an  intermediary  that  helped  to  build  the
infrastructure for international data transmission. But, similarly, I was unable to find any
relevant records on Polish participation in this network.45 
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27 In light of the political context, we might ask whether this kind of academic collaboration
and data exchange was feasible at all. The development of advanced technologies related
to  the  peaceful  application  of  nuclear  energy  was  extensively  used  in  Soviet  Bloc
propaganda where it was contrasted with the malevolent application of nuclear energy
by,  in  the  common  ideological  label  for  Western  capitalist  countries,  “imperialist
warmongers.”46 Informatyka, a Polish journal for computer professionals from 1977 clearly
shows  how  the  concept  of  computer  networks  was  articulated  as  a  development
consistent with communist ideological principles.
The fostering of cooperation between remote research centres will be possible with
information  transmission  […]  Computer  networks  would  enable  people  from
different countries to learn about each other, to find a common language, and to
share data and experiences. We hope that networks will become a positive factor
for science and for humankind.47
28 In this quotation we can see how Polish computer scientists used the highly standardized
language  of  communist  propaganda  in  an  attempt  to  define  computer  network
technology as acceptable and desirable to policymakers. 
29 More academic computer networks were developed in the 1980s with the flagship state
program  named  Międzyuczelniana  Sieć  Komputerowa  (Inter‑University  Computer
Network).48) in Moscow. This connection was supposed to enable researchers from both
countries to access databases from the fields of social, economic and natural sciences.49 In
1987,  the  establishment  of  a  Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance  (CMEA)‑wide
scientific  computer  network  was  discussed.  but  it  is  unclear  if  any  plans  were
implemented.”50 
30 In the mid‑1980s US, the BITNET network system (est. in 1981) became widespread among
the  natural  sciences  academic  community as  a  means  of  keeping  daily  contact  and
circulating research data among members of geographically dispersed research teams.51
At  the  same  time,  researchers  from several  Western  European  countries  established
international EARN (European Academic and Research Network), which aimed to foster
academic collaboration at the international level.52 Polish scientists who managed to get
academic fellowships in the West learned how to use this system. Polish physicist Jacek
Gajewski recalled : 
As  (mostly)  high  energy  physicists,  who  usually  work  in  large  international
collaborations, we used BITNET extensively during our stays in other countries, and
felt very handicapped without it at home.53
Another scientist, Tadeusz Węgrzynowski, with a background in electronic engineering
remembered  how  he  attempted  to  keep  up  his  BITNET  contacts  upon  returning  to
Poland :
My first  contact with BITNET was in Canada,  in 1988.  […] When I  came back to
Poland for a  couple of  months,  I  installed several  connections from PC’s  to our
mainframe at the University of Warsaw. At this time, I was only dreaming about
electronic mail from Poland to Canada and the world […] The fastest way of sending
letters to Canada was by the help of strangers flying to Toronto. It worked, but it
was difficult and it took a lot of time. This way many Polish scientists, cooperating
with their partners in other countries, exchanged mail.54
31 Howard Davies and Beatrice Bressan, while discussing the rise of international computer
networks in Europe of the 1980s, claim that the issue of linking Poland and Hungary to
the  EARN  was  discussed  in  1985.55 At  that  time,  the  main  obstacle  was  the  CoCom
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(Coordinating  Committee  for  Multilateral  Export  Controls)  controlled  mostly  by  US
governmental agencies, which routinely voted against internationalization attempts.56 
32 In 1987 Marek Zieliński, a Polish chemist and former Solidarity activist who emigrated to
the US, established a telephone modem‑based Bulletin Board System (BBS) forum named
“EARN‑Poland Link Discussion” and later a second forum “BITNET to Poland” (1988).57 In
an article  in  influential  Polityka weekly  magazine  from 1994  this  dispersed  scientific
community  of  Polish  scholars  linked  with  computer  networks  was  referred  as  an
“electronic  diaspora.”58 Zieliński  and  his  colleagues  from  the  academic  community
started a public campaign to win US Department of Commerce (DoC) permission to access
international  academic  networks.  As  Zieliński  claimed,  export  restrictions  made  it
impossible  to  join  both  BITNET  and  EARN.  The  campaign  petitioning  the  DoC  was
supported by prominent figures such as Ira Fuchs, the founder of BITNET, and Stefan
Amsterdamski, a renowned Polish historian of science who also had personal contacts
abroad. While trying to gain support and submitting petitions to the DoC, Polish scientists
managed to cope with existing constraints by using a telephone modem‑based FidoNet
system to communicate with other members of their research groups abroad. Zieliński
remembered :
The electronic contacts with Poland were soon becoming more frequent. Although
there was no EARN node in Poland yet, a number of researchers participating in
joint programs with universities in Germany, Denmark and Switzerland obtained
accounts on the university computers, which they could access also from Poland.59
33 In the end, Polish universities were able to join EARN only in 1990, when the CoCom lifted
the ban on computer and telecommunication technologies exports to Eastern Europe.60
The official announcement of Poland and other Eastern European countries’ access to
EARN took place on April  10,  1990.  The first  EARN Polish node named PLEARN4 was
opened on July 7 at the University of Warsaw. Smereczyński remembered :
This was the day [April 10, 1990] when everybody’s efforts to bring The Network to
Poland had been crowned.  The solemn announcement of  the formal  EARN vote
result was heartrending, especially when heard from the EARN president, Mr. Frode
Greisen  himself  at  the  Senate  Hall  of  Warsaw  University.  It  admitted  Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union to EARN. A lucky day for
the Polish academic community. In my opinion, that extraordinary moment was
more important for Europe than the destruction of the Berlin Wall, because, if the
Berlin Wall was a symbol and nothing else, then the first EARN link with Poland
could be considered the real creation of the ties bringing the former Eastern Block
together with Europe. And this positive movement started again from Poland.61
34 Clearly, the establishment of a network system dedicated to academic data exchange had
a symbolic value for the academic community. Smereczyński’s testimony touches upon a
significant question about different moments in the period of transition that could be
considered  relevant  to  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.  Here  we  can  see  that  joining  the
telecommunications system could be identified as a moment of a significant transition, a
literal joining of two previously closed worlds. 
35 Attempts  to  link  Poland  to  EARN,  which  according  to  Badenoch and  Fickers  can  be
definitely  considered  a  “contested  process”  in  the  emergence  of  international
telecommunications infrastructure, show the clash of two visions of computer networks.
First  was  the  ethos  of  academic  “internationalism”  in  which  international  contacts
among academics can only foster the development of science viewed as a common good.
The second vision, as US governmental policy and the CoCom show, was embedded in the
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notion of a “closed world” that should be not penetrable by anyone from the other side of
the Iron Curtain.
 
Computer modems and catching up with the world
36 From the mid‑1980s, the possibility of owning a private modem hooked up to a personal
computer at home enabled private users to join the “electronic community” of computer
hobbyists. In 1980s Poland, computer hobbyists gathered in state‑sponsored computer
clubs.  Two Polish  magazines,  Bajtek (1985‑1996)  and  Komputer (1986‑1990),  played  an
influential role as a source of technical information and a cultural intermediary for such
circles.62 Both periodicals regularly published articles with practical information about
modem use and encouraged readers to use modems to contact with other modem users in
Poland  and  abroad.  Moreover,  their  editors  appealed  to  governmental  agencies  for
official  acknowledgement  of  modem  use  and  support  since,  as  they  argued,  joining
international electronic communities with telecommunication technologies is one of the
indicators of belonging to the developed world. The editors of both magazines as well as
club activists established extensive international contacts with their counterparts both in
the Soviet Bloc and Western Europe using snail mail as well as modems. 
37 In  the  1980s  US,  hobbyist  computing  circles  adopted a  modem‑based  Bulletin  Board
System  as  the  basic  means  of  communication  for  sending  information  and  for  the
distribution of software. The high price of long‑distance calls and modem connections
stimulated the development of software that offered late‑night dialling to other bulletin
boards for the exchange of messages. In these systems, BBS nodes were used as gateways
for  the  transmission  of  received  messages  addressed  to  other  computers.  The  most
popular such protocol was FidoNet which gained popularity both in the US and Western
Europe.63 In Europe the most prominent computer club was the Dutch Hobby Computer
Club (HCC),  which boasted an extensive network of foreign contacts.  One of the club
activists, who was also the HCC FidoNet sysop (system operator), was a Polish émigré
named Maciej Kollo who worked in the Dutch IT industry.64 In 1986, Kollo established
contacts  with  the  editors  of  Komputer.  During  a  visit  of  the  magazine’s  editors  to  a
computer fair held by the HCC in Utrecht, the HCC officially provided Poles access to
FidoNet’s global networks through the HCC gateway.
38 Komputer magazine extensively discussed the potential advantages of FidoNet. Finally on
July 29,  1987 the first  Polish FidoNet  node was opened on a  computer  in Komputer’s 
editorial office.65 Between 1987 and 1989, Komputer regularly published calling numbers
and brief  information on other  Polish network nodes as  well  as  technical  hints  and
information on modem registration. The number of FidoNet users in Poland could be
estimated at a few dozen. In April 1989, Komputer claimed that the magazine’s FidoNet
node has 150 registered users who logged on frequently.66 However, other information
from members of the FidoNet community claimed that in 1989 there were about a dozen
of private users who established their FidoNet nodes.67 It is plausible that virtually every
member of the FidoNet community was a computer professional working at a university
or in the electronics industry.
39 It is also difficult to describe the actual uses of modem‑based computer networks at that
time. The title of an article on FidoNet in Informatyka journal, “FidoNet – an international
amateur computer network” shows the symbolic meaning of this  system as one that
provided Polish computer amateurs with the means to connect to a broader community.68
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It also indicates that, unlike exclusive academic networks such as EARN discussed above,
FidoNet was open to a broader group of computer aficionados. It is difficult to estimate if
this  network  was  used  in  Poland  to  send  any  programs  or  only  sporadic  messages.
However, in the 1980s, FidoNet was considered a state of the art and elitist ”electronic
community”  in  circles  of  computer  users,  and  accessing  this  system had  significant
symbolic value because it provided a symbolic membership in this worldwide community.
69 
40 To better understand the context of the rise of FidoNet use, it is important to ask about
the possibilities  of  using of  a  modem in state socialist  Poland.  Discussions about the
dissemination of privately‑owned computer modems and the legalization of modem show
that  these  currents  were  generally  accepted,  or  even  welcomed,  by  the  Ministry  of
Communications  responsible  for  telephone  infrastructure.  Modem‑based  computer
networks, which enabled international connections, used the public telephone system not
specifically dedicated to modem use.70 The only technical requirement for modem use
was the necessity of access to a telephone network with an automatic switching system. It
was impossible to use a computer modem with manual switching boards, which were still
used in Polish telecommunications in the mid‑1980s.  On the one hand, the telephone
modem offered computer network access to anyone who owned a landline could access to
an automatic switching board. On the other hand, it caused several problems since the
telephone companies and state agencies that controlled public communications (such as
the Federal Communications Commission in the US) were rather reluctant to adopt or
promote modem use. 
41 In Poland, an international semi‑automatic switching system was introduced in the late
1960s. In propaganda newsreels from 1968 and 1972, the introduction of this system was
shown as a symbol of technological modernity and opening up to the world beyond the
Iron  Curtain.  In  both  newsreels  –  “Colleagues  from  the  telephone  exchange”  and
“Conversations with the world”– female operators responsible for switching were shown
at work while making arrangements with callers in English, German, and Italian. They
were also shown chitchatting with their counterparts in other countries. This kind of
activity  was  highly  unwelcomed  in  Western  telephone  companies.  However,  in
communist propaganda newsreels, the meaning of the scenes was different. This newsreel
refers to a broader theme of Polish propaganda of the 1970s, a time of relative opening to
the West.  Female telephone operators chitchatting in fluent English or Spanish were
shown as  modern Poles  successfully  catching up with the West.71 It  is  unclear  when
exactly Poland introduced fully automated switching boards for international calls, but in
the mid‑1980s such connections were available for calls to all socialist countries, except
Romania, and most of Western Europe, including the Netherlands.72 
42 Jan Stożek, one of the pioneers of FidoNet in Poland, claimed that he became interested in
modem use in the mid‑1980s while  visiting the Netherlands and observing how HCC
members were using modems to communicate with other computer clubs around the
world.73 He recalled that at first he and his colleagues doubted if it would be feasible to
use modems in Poland at all. It is unclear if he was referring to technical or political
obstructions. One of the first Komputer articles on modem use claimed that aside from the
prohibitive price (about $ 100 for an imported modem), it  was simply illegal to use a
modem according to  the  current  law that  forbade sending “encrypted messages”  by
phone.74 This article referred to regulations from before June 1986, when a resolution of
the  Ministry  of  Communications  allowed  “teleinformatic  connections”  (połączenia
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teleinformatyczne).75 As one Ministry of Communications official claimed in 1986, two
months before the introduction of the resolution, the Ministry already allowed modem
use for registered users. There were, he maintained, a few dozen registered users, and
“some of them even managed to establish highly remote connections, even with the US.”
76 
43 Much like  the  propaganda newsreels  mentioned above,  such claims had a  particular
propaganda value.  In  the  1960s  and 1970s,  both the  introduction of  semi‑automated
switching boards and the fluency of female Polish operators in foreign languages could be
shown as  indicators  of  successes  in  the  recent  policy  towards  opening  to  the  West.
Similarly, claims about possible modem connections with the US were proof that despite
the political and economic crises of the 1980s and Western economic restrictions, Poland
was still moving forward in terms of technological progress, and Polish computer users
had access to a state of the art telecommunications system. 
44 According to the new regulation, modem users had to register with the Ministry, provide
a  homologation  certificate  for  any  privately‑owned  modem,  pay  a  monthly  fee,  and
deposit a floppy disk with their data transfer protocol.77 The Ministry of Communication
adopted the international modem homologation standard known as the CCITT (Comité
Consultatif International Téléphonique et Télégraphique) V.21.78 Modems compliant with
this  norm  were  approved  without  the  need  for  highly  expensive  homologation.  A
restrictive approach to homologation and technical norms was fully understandable at
that time since several computer peripherals could cause significant interference with
television and radio signals. One computer journalist wrote that bureaucratic problems
with modem use lasted in Poland after  1989.  As  he claimed,  during his  visits  in the
Ministry of Communications he was told the basic reason why the Ministry intended to
raise the charge for modem use. According to the unnamed Ministry official, the charge
for using a modem should be higher than that for a telephone call since, as he claimed,
modems overload telephone networks,  cause faster wear,  and require more electrical
power.79 Given the lack of any particular sources on possible constraints on modem use of
a political nature in the 1980s, the high rates for modem registration and the general
reluctance of Ministry office clerks mentioned in Bajtek and Komputer could be simply
explained by the nature of state socialist bureaucracy, which did not suddenly disappear
after year 1989.
45 Aside from the prohibitive cost of a modem itself, there were two other constraints on
modem use in state socialist Poland. The telephone itself was at that time still a rarity in
Polish households. Another problem was the poor quality of the telephone networks.80 As
Prof. Władysław Majewski, the Minister of Communications, admitted in an interview for
Komputer,  modem users  were  welcomed  by  his  institution ;  however,  he  also  openly
admitted that it was virtually impossible to establish even a domestic modem connection
during working hours because of the overload and poor quality of the telephone network.
81 
46 The  case  of  the  modem  shows  that  in  order  to  understand  the  domestication  of
communications  systems,  we  need  to  consider  the  often  mundane  materiality  of
communications  technologies.82 One  can  ask  why  the  Ministry  of  Communications
introduced the legal framework and procedures for private modem use since, as we have
seen, there were no more than a few dozen potential users. The Minister claimed that his
decision to provide resources for the improvement of modem communications and the
development of an administrative unit responsible for modem use was highly criticized in
Electronic Battlefields, Visions of Progress and Computer Networks in State S...
Cahiers du monde russe, 56/2-3 | 2015
13
the upper ranks of communist party.83 As he explained,  he was criticized because he
diverted resources from attempts to increase the number of household telephones. At
that time, less than one half of Polish households had a telephone, and the number of
telephones  was  one  tangible  indicator  of  a  country’s  modernity.  In  1986,  the  Polish
government started a massive program of the “electronization of the national economy”
whose aim was to stimulate R&D and manufacturing in electronics and the development
of telecommunications networks as means of modernizing and levelling the “technology
gap” between Poland and the West.84 We can assume that the resources were diverted to
the introduction of modem use, since modem‑based computer networks were a symbol of
technological  modernity  with  propaganda  value,  showing  that  socialist  Poland  was




47 This  article  has  shown how imagined,  proposed  and  planned  computer  networks  in
Poland in the 1970s and 1980s were embedded in the discourse on economic, social and
scientific progress. As Badenoch and Fickers argue, instead of trying to grasp the social
change caused by the development of communications infrastructure, it is more useful to
explore the “contested process” of making a network. Studying these processes also sheds
light on relatively unexplored aspects of the cultural and media history of the Soviet Bloc.
The plans to build computer networks in the late 1960s were clearly influenced by the
enthusiasm for cybernetics. However, at the same time, the acceptance of these plans by
decision makers shows that computer networks had been successfully presented to them
as  a  means  of  economic  and  social  progress  that  fit  in  with  communist  ideological
principles.  Also,  attempts to use computer networks for the “internationalization” of
science definitely fit into broader patterns of change in the Soviet Bloc, showing that
state  socialist  countries  were  relatively  eager  to  open  up  to  the  world  by  enabling
particular forms of the flow of people,  commodities,  and information across the Iron
Curtain. 
48 Traditionally studies of media communications in the Soviet Bloc emphasize the role of
state‑owned media as a means for the distribution of propaganda content, or alternative
media systems as an attempt to challenge state control.  This study offers a different
perspective. Instead of showing how computer and modem users simply challenged the
state  monopoly  in  telecommunications,  I  have  shown  how  eagerly  bureaucrats
acknowledged the use of privately‑owned modems, since they were already part of the
public discourse of  techno‑scientific progress.  This case also shows how the US state
agencies played a role in hindering the development of international computer networks.
Thus, the same technological system could be considered by different historical actors as
a means of social and scientific progress or as a national security concern. Further studies
of  such  “contested  processes”  in  the  emergence  of  media  and  telecommunications
systems in the Soviet Bloc could help us to better understand how the Cold War was a
time  when  political  and  military  confrontations  overlapped  with  public  enthusiasm
towards visions of technological modernity. 
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RÉSUMÉS
Cet article étudie la façon dont les représentations du progrès scientifique, économique et social
ont influencé le développement des réseaux informatiques de télécommunication en Pologne
socialiste.  L’auteur  avance  que  les  tentatives  d’établir  des  réseaux  de  communication  entre
ordinateurs étaient interdépendantes de l’image de la communication électronique en tant que
vecteur de progrès scientifique et économique. Tout en analysant le développement de systèmes
particuliers de télécommunication tels les réseaux informatiques académiques et les ordinateurs
privés, l’auteur démontre comment une telle représentation, juxtaposée à une vision de ce qu’on
appelle le « champ de bataille électronique », influença la compréhension publique des réseaux
informatiques.  Fondé  sur  des  documents  d’archives,  des  actes  législatifs  et  des  périodiques
informatiques,  cet  article  montre  comment  les  informaticiens,  les  décideurs  politiques et  la
communauté scientifique influencèrent la construction sociale des réseaux informatiques en tant
que vecteurs de modernité et de développement social et scientifique.
This essay discusses how imageries of scientific, economic, and social progress influenced the
development  of  computer‑based  telecommunication  networks  in  state  socialist  Poland.  The
author argues that attempts at establishing communication networks between computers were
interdependent  with  imageries  of  electronic  communication  as  a  vector  of  economic  and
scientific progress. While discussing the development of particular telecommunication systems
such  as  academic  computer  networks  and  privately  owned  personal  computer  modems,  the
author shows how such imagery, juxtaposed with a vision of the so called “electronic battlefield,”
influenced public understanding of computer networks. Based on archival documents, legislative
acts and computer periodicals, this article shows how computer professionals, policy makers, and
the scientific community influenced the social construction of computer networks as vectors of
modernity and social and scientific development.
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